Those who teach or are taught medical ethics with a heavy reliance on case studies should be warnedfirst of all that the practice tends to exaggerate the degree to which morality is controversial. Secondly, they ought to realise that it is often quite unclear what problems count as moral problems. Thirdly, they will need to bear in mind that there may be -and presumably are -limits to what we may regard as open to discussion. It would be quite superficial to assume that ethics teachers, going along with what is generally accepted by their colleagues in this matter, would never tempt students to disregard these limits.
Medical ethics will often be taught by a consideration of case-studies. We are all familiar with what goes on. The student will be taken on a ward-round of curious examples, which at least pretend to be drawn from actual cases, in order as it were to give him or her experience on the job: the job of moral judgment. He will not come unprepared to the task, for there will have been some introductory material offering various 'moral theories' (bundled up like tools in a tool-box), but he will -I suspect -not come very well prepared either (1). I have certain disquiets about this way of proceeding which I want to share with you. Nothing that I say is meant to suggest that the employment of case-studies is out of place in teaching ethics. Even Jesus taught in parables (2). It is perhaps better to teach in this way than depend upon the uncertainties, absurdities even, of what is called moral theory. And I shall myself make a certain use of the case-study method in putting my argument.
First of all, we should ask ourselves whether the continued use of controversial examples serves to exaggerate the extent to which morality, as distinct from moral theory, is controversial. we suppose (some philosophers apart) to be quite uncontroversial wrong-doings: killing a patient in order to provide useful organs for other patients, kidnapping a more or less rational adult patient off the street and administering much needed therapy against his will, telling straightforward lies to the local authority in order to improve one's services -that sort of thing -and then raise the question why these actions are wrong. It is very easy to give unsatisfactory answers (3). In this way, as indeed in regard to so many of our everyday 'non-moral Now it might be thought that no one teaching moral philosophy by the use of case studies could seriously offer examples of the slippers in the kitchen variety. But I suspect, by listening in to such instruction, that this can happen. Of course, the unsatisfactoriness is concealed. Here are a couple of examples more or less copied out of Ethics and the Health Services Manager (6).
Case study three: The wrong dose: A staff nurse has given a baby double the normal dose of a drug. The baby had a slight reaction but has now recovered.
The clinical nurse manager feels that the nurse should be suspended from duty and reported to the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC).
As the unit general manager, what advice would you give?
Case study four: Incident in the outpatients department: A sister in the outpatients department reports that a patient asked to speak to her confidentially yesterday about an incident the patient says happened to him last time he visited outpatients. He was seen at the end of the session, which overran. The consultant had assured the nurse on the clinic that this was a simple follow-up and added that she was happy to see the patient on her own. The patient now alleges, some weeks later, that the consultant sexually assaulted him. He does not wish to make trouble, however, and does not want the matter to go further; he just thought the sister should know. The consultant is very senior and highly respected, and the sister has worked with her for years.
Sister So the first consideration when presented with a case study is this: one should ask whether it presents a moral issue at all. It is important to ask this question, even if we cannot always expect the answer to be very clear-cut, as morality must be a pretty vague concept. If we do not attend to this matter we shall find ourselves involved in very tedious discussions. People will be put off medical ethics altogether, save those with an abnormal appetite for uplift. What practical problems count as moral problems -or perhaps better, as issues of justice, or of obligationis a question we need to consider. We live in an era of rising expectations. We expect more and more from morality, and the 'ethicists' who are supposed to know about it. We shall find ourselves invited to discuss Investment Ethics, Culinary Ethics, Leisure Ethics, Chiropody Ethics, Ballroom Dancing Ethics, etc, all with their attendant case studies. There will soon be journals devoted to such topics. All this to the delight of the modem commercial university which cannot see the good for the fees (7).
Second caution
I turn now to the second caution I wish to make in regard to the case-study method of moral education. My argument so far has amounted to a complaint that morality was being taken too seriously; for the idea that there is always something that is demanded of one is surely inspired by over-earnestness. I now want to suggest that in some of our discussions of case studies, morality is not being taken seriously enough. It is perhaps the very extravagance of the morality of perpetual injunction that makes us insensitive to the injunctions that really matter. Once again, I shall make up an example, this time somewhat more elaborate, to bring out the point. In its form it closely resembles case-study questions that I have actually heard discussed, and I also suspect that in its matter it is not a wholly unreasonable parody.
You are to imagine that you are a student at a well-known Central European university in the nineteen-thirties. Your amiable and impressive teacher of philosophy has conscientiously prepared some materials for you. They comprise the usual tour through moral theories, and some case studies, among which you will find the following.
Case-study five: Responsible treatment of the insane: As the head of a psychiatric hospital, you have to decide what is to happen to three of your patients, Herr X, Herr Y, and Frau Z. All are due for termination. The facts. There are three methods of termination available. The first is painless, but causes convulsions, and this is very distressing for the nursing staff. The second is also painless, and death is peaceful. But the body is rendered useless for research purposes. The third method is really quite uncomfortable for the patient, but fortunately does not have to take place when there are nurses present. This method allows valuable experimental work to be undertaken, both before and after death, work that is expected to be of considerable benefit to other patients. Note that the first method is twice as expensive to use as either of the other two. Herr X has expressed a strong preference to be terminated by the second method. When the matter is put to Frau Z she just giggles. ( Note that I am not saying that we should refuse to discuss this sort of case in any way at all. I am in fact discussing it right now. And of course there is a need to discuss why it is wrong to terminate our psychiatric patients. As I said at the beginning, it is important to seek to understand better what we know. Tearing up the paper is not an invitation to stop thinking. But we should not be prepared seriously to consider certain possibilities put to us, and we should not by our participation in such discussions give the impression that we go along with the serious consideration of such possibilities. Such a refusal need not of course be made in a spirit of self-righteousness. For that would indicate a pride that none of us can afford.
Nothing depends here on my particular example. It would be beside the point to say for example that the author of this paper simply has a hang-up about the killing of psychiatric patients, that he dislikes this sort of thing. If there are some kinds of action, perhaps not including the one I suggested, which should not be put before us as options, then our students should be made aware of the fact. They should be aware of their right, indeed their duty, to object to the proceedings and to refuse to participate. To consider whether to X, even in hypothetical circumstances, is after all an action. As an action it is open to moral appraisal; and it might turn out to be bad. A student, unimpressed with the fact that a case study had the official blessing of the course instructor, and who was prepared to stand out from the crowd and say 'This is just not something I am willing to discuss, and I suggest you do not discuss it either' should, I think, earn our respect, even if in the particular case he seemed to us to have shown bad judgment. In my experience, students seem quite unmindful that such an issue might arise.
Unreasonableness
We will perhaps be asked whether someone who teaches or praises this kind of intolerance might not be inviting unreasonableness and ill-will. Well, intolerance certainly has its dangers. But so too does 'a little learning' -though we all have to start by learning a little. (As for much learning it makes a man mad, or so they say.) What kind of moral education is safe? Is it safe for example to teach a critical attitude? Teach someone to be critical and goodness knows what he might do, to his detriment and to ours. Is it safe to teach kindness? Teach a man to be kind and he might think it necessary to be cruel. Sometimes one simply has to live with dangers, as when one drives a car or walks across the road.
If asked why it is necessary to take this line -and there must be some reason -we would perhaps say something like this: that it is important not only to avoid certain actions, but also to avoid certain invitations to action. Someone who works in a bank should not allow himself to dream of what he might do with the money. He should not dwell on the what-ifs. ' What if I were in desperate need ...'. 'What if my aunt was in desperate need ...?' 'What if it were someone else's aunt ...?' 'What if there were a hundred needy aunts, and the bank had treated me rather badly ... ?' I do not mean to suggest, nor do I believe, that property rights are sacred in the face of need. But a bank employee is in a position of trust, unlike a hungry man walking beside a field of turnips. Doctors who are in charge of the weak and vulnerable have a special duty not to so much as dream of harming them, even in the interests of 'good causes'. Nor should they get themselves used to the idea of harming them by considering invitations to harm incorporated in case studies. Nor, where trust is so important and yet so fragile, should they become involved in earnest discussions about whether a lie might not be for the best in a certain situation -a situation devised especially to make a lie a tempting option. (We might make the same remarks about the police. We ought not to encourage the trainee policemen in our charge to consider case studies in which they are offered the option of ill-treating members of the public, with due expressions of regret, in order to extract important confessions.) If one wanted to corrupt people one might try getting them to agree to do certain beastly things in hypothetical cases. I have no empirical data on the effectiveness of this technique, but it would seem suitable to the job in hand. A gradual approach would clearly be desirable. One would begin by inducing them to accept such things as a live option, as a choice they could respect, even if it would not be their own.
In saying that doctors (and the police) should not be taught in a way which presupposes that certain kinds of wickedness -assisting with torture, let us say -are to be regarded as open to choice, it might be thought that I was wishing to make an exception for philosophers. Philosophers are not often called on to assist with torture -that is a medical, or a military, hazard. But I do not think that we philosophers can safely exempt ourselves. We have our own vulnerability. Those who want to torture might well look to the writings of philosophers, particularly those in applied ethics, for comfort and reassurance. In any case, no one, philosopher or not, can know when he might be tempted into grave wickedness, even torture. So there are kinds of action that human beings quite generally, including philosophers, are not to contemplate.
What I have been saying here is not, I believe, particularly new. It is very much in the spirit of Elizabeth Anscombe's celebrated article 'Modern moral philosophy' (9) . And Richard Hare has emphasised that there are certain things that a good man will simply not think of doing (10). Such agreement between philosophers who might be thought to have rather little in common is quite impressive. The point, however, is something that seems rarely to be taken account of: I have never heard it raised in practice when case studies are being thought up or presented (1 1 
